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STRICT LIABILITY IN MILITARY AVIATION
CASES-SHOULD IT APPLY?
FRANK FINN*
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Prosser, The Fall of The Citadel (Strict Liability To The Consumer), 50 MINN.
L. REV. 791 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Fall]; Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel
(Strict Liability To The Consumer), 69 YAL1E L.J. 1099 (1960) [hereinafter cited as
Assault].
' See, e.g., 0. S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103 Ariz. 556, 447 P.2d 248 (1968); Garth-
wait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284, 216 A.2d 189 (1965); Cornette v. Searjeant Metal Prod.
Inc., 147 Ind. App. 46, 258 N.E.2d 652 (1970); Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Ford
Motor Co., 174 N.W. 2d 672 (Iowa 1970); State Stove Manuf. Co. v. Hodges, 189
So.2d 113, (Miss. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1967); Brandenburger v. Toyota
Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268 (1973); Kohler v. Ford Motor
Co., 187 Neb. 428, 191 N.W.2d 601 (1971); Stang v. Hertz Corp. 83 N.M. 730, 497
P.2d 732 (1972); Seay v. General Elevator Co., 522 P.2d 1022 (Okla. 1974); Ritter v.
Narragansett Elec. Co., 109 R.I. 176, 283 A.2d 255 (1971); Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon,
217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d 240 (1966); Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wash. 2d 522,
452 P.2d 72 (1969); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
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of Torts (Second).3 During the period that the assault has
raged, few, if any, manufacturers of products have survived
unscathed." Among the wounded have been manufacturers of
both military aircraft and their component parts.' Courts
have given scant attention, however, to the basic question of
whether the doctrine of strict liability is an appropriate vehi-
cle for imposing money judgments on the manufacturers of
military hardware. This article will discuss the public policy
reasons for and against applying the doctrine of strict tort lia-
bility to manufacturers of military aircraft, court decisions al-
luding to this issue, and alternative approaches.
1 Section 402A deals with the special liaility of the seller of a product for Physical
Harm to the User or Consumer and expressly provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or to his property is subject to liability for phys-
ical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a prod-
uct, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer with-
out substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
See, e.g., Haragan v. Union Oil Co., 312 F. Supp. 1392 (D. Alaska 1970) (auto-
matic gas detection alarm system); Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427
(N.D. Ind. 1965) (forklift); Marko v. Stop & Shop, Inc., 169 Conn. 550, 364 A.2d 217
(1975) (exploding bottle); Sweeney v. Max A. R. Matthews & Co., 94 Ill. App. 2d 6,
236 N.E.2d 439, aff'd, 46 Ill. 2d 64, 264 N.E. 2d 170 (1970) (concrete nails); Rivera v.
Rockford Mach. & Tool Co., 1 111. App. 3d 641, 274 N.E.2d 828 (1971) (plastic injec-
tion molding machine); Perfection Paint & Color Co. v. Konduris, 147 Ind. App. 106,
258 N.E.2d 681 (1970) (paint); Mid-South Packers, Inc. v. Gould, 263 So.2d 785
(Miss. 1972) (hot dog); Olson v. A. W. Chesterson Co., 256 N.W.2d 530 (N.D. 1977)
(conveyor belt dressing product); Tucker v. Unit Crane & Shovel Corp., 256 Or. 318,
473 P.2d 862 (1970) (crane); Lamphiear v. Skagit Corp., 6 Wash. App. 350, 493 P.2d
1018 (1972) (logging spar); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542
P.2d 774 (1975) (bus). The foregoing are but a few examples of the many products for
which manufacturers have been held strictly liable. The examples are not intended to
be an exhaustive nor complete listing.
1 See Lindsay v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corp., 331 F. Supp. 257 (E.D. Mo.
1971), rev'd, 460 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 1972); Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310
(9th Cir. 1961).
6 See Id. See also Foster v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 502 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1974);
Challoner v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 512 F.2d 77 (5th Cir.), vacated, 423 U.S. 3
(1975).
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I. THE RATIONALE FOR IMPOSING STRICT LIABILITY
Just as the history of modern flight progressed from the
sands of Kitty Hawk to the planets and beyond, so the doc-
trine of strict product liability marches on. To determine
whether the doctrine should be imposed on manufacturers of
military aircraft under all circumstances, the underpinnings
for the doctrine of strict tort liability must be examined
closely.
The theoretical justifications for the doctrine of strict liabil-
ity, though few in number, are interrelated. First, by placing a
product into the stream of commerce, the manufacturer as-
sumes a responsibility to protect the user from harm caused
by a defect in the product.8 Second, the public interest in
health and safety requires the manufacturer to bear responsi-
bility for any harm caused by a defect in the product that is
sold to the consumer.' Third, by marketing the product, the
manufacturer presumably represents to the public that the
product is safe for use and assumes an obligation for breach of
such representation. 10 Fourth, the threat of liablity gives an
incentive to the manufacturer to produce a safe product.1"
Fifth, the manufacturer is in the best position to bear the bur-
den of loss because it can, through the use of liability insur-
ance, spread the risk of loss among all consumers.1 2 Finally,
manufacturers of products should stand behind their products
when injury is caused by a defect in the product."
Given these justifications for the doctrine, a fundamental
purpose for imposition of strict tort liability on manufacturers
of products is to place the risk of loss on the party in the best
See supra note 1. See also 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY §
16A, 3B-1 (1980).
a MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). See also,
w. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 96, 642 (4th ed.) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]
; See PROSSER, supra note 8, at 652. See generally Henningson v. Bloomfield Mo-
tors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
,o See PROSSER, supra, note 8, at 651.
" Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 253, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (Traynor
J., concurring).
Assault, supra note 1, at 1122.
I Id. at 1123.
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position to prevent defects. The ability of the manufacturer to
protect itself by acquiring insurance that covers the cost of
injuries resulting from defective products is another justifica-
tion for imposition of strict tort liability." Manufacturers of
military hardware, especially aircraft, however, are not neces-
sarily as well situated, particularly in the area of design
defects.
The "purchase" of a military aircraft differs significantly
from the "purchase" of a product by an ordinary consumer.
The development of the aircraft typically begins with an in-
formal suggestion by the federal government, or the manufac-
turer, followed by design, mock-up, prototype, test work, and
final production models. 8 Design features dictated by the
projected requirements of the aircraft often make this process
one of compromise."' Throughout the development, the pur-
chaser works closely with the manufacturer in the design and
testing of the aircraft. Contracts for production are entered
into following successful testing of the prototypes.1 7 Finally,
long after the first contact, the actual "purchase" of the air-
craft is made. By that time the purchaser, which is usually the
federal government or a foreign government, may be as know
ledgeable about the design, test results and capabilities of the
product as is its manufacturer.
Military manufacturers and government purchasers are
treated differently in lawsuits brought to recover damages for
injuries caused by product defects. The doctrine of sovereign
immunity shields the government against claims by injured
military personnel or the survivors of deceased servicemen. 8
" "The purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting
from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on
the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect them-
selves." Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
" See Kropp v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 329 F. Supp. 447 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
16 Id. at 456. "The particular mission of a military aircraft of necessity, determines
many of its design features. For the plane must be so designed and constructed as to
be capable of performing its special mission." Id.
17 Id.
" See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
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Manufacturers, however, are not afforded similar protection.1 9
The question becomes whether the manufacturer should bear
the risk of loss alone when any culpability may be entirely
that of its partner, the federal government.
A. Assumed Responsibility
As previously noted, the first justification for imposing
strict tort liability on the manufacturer is that by putting the
product on the market, the manufacturer has assumed the re-
sponsibility for harm caused by defects in the product.2 0 In
the case of aircraft manufactured for the general public this
may be true. The commercial manufacturer designs an air-
craft which contains safety features and devices, including
secondary and back-up systems. While the "target" purchaser
of the aircraft is kept in mind during the design phase of the
aircraft, there is little, if any, direct consultation between the
manufacturer and the ultimate purchaser.
Military aircraft manufacturers, however, must consult with
the branch of the armed service contracting for the aircraft.
Various parameters, such as size, weight, range, payload and
performance, are dictated by the branch of the armed service
involved and figure prominently in the design of the aircraft.
Although secondary or back-up systems may be recommended
by the manufacturer, the federal government has the power to
delete them from the final product.2 Such safety systems may
See Whitaker v. Harrell-Kilgore Corp., 418 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1969), reh'g de-
nied, 424 F.2d 549 (1970).
SO See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
See Kropp v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 329 F. Supp. 447 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). In Kropp,
the court observed:
Safety is one of the design features and, as such, is governed by these
general design principles. It would be highly desireable, for example,
that a plane . . . have a 'back-up system,'. . . in an attempt to insure
100% reliability of the plane's systems. However, weight and size are
vital considerations, particularly in military craft. . . . For these and a
variety of other reasons, back-up systems (although desirable from the
standpoint of safety) are not feasible in every instance in the design
and construction of a military craft. . . . This is not to say that de-
signers are unconcerned with safety. Rather, they attempt to design as
safe a plane as possible within the scope of its mission.
Id. at 456.
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not be essential to accomplishment of the federal govern-
ment's primary goal of designing a safe aircraft while still ful-
filling the mission parameters.2
Frequently, the manufacturer of military aircraft plays no
more than a supporting role in the design process. Addition-
ally, design considerations are fundamentally different from
those associated with products sold to the general public.23
Therefore, while the manufacturer of military aircraft has in-
deed put an aircraft on the market, it does not follow that the
manufacturer should be held solely responsible for all defects,
especially those of design.
When the injury or death of an American serviceman re-
sults from an aircraft accident allegedly caused by a defect in
the design of either a military aircraft or component, public
policy militates against holding a manufacturer strictly liable
for the resulting damages. This proposition is especially true
where the government purchaser controlled the design of the
product. On the other hand, plaintiffs seeking redress can ar-
gue persuasively that strict liability should apply to military
product manufacturers in a case alleging that injury or death
was caused by either a manufacturing defect or less persua-
sively, failure to include adequate warnings in applicable
manuals published by the manufacturer, particularly if the
military had no input in their publication. Similar policy con-
siderations ought to apply in a case arising out of an accident
involving either a military aircraft or component purchased by
his government from the government of the United States."'
B. Public Interest in Safety
Certainly, the importance of health and safety requires that
a party injured by a defective product be compensated for
damages suffered. Some courts have held that the responsibil-
Id.
" See Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 144 N.J. Super. 1, 364 A.2d 43 (Law Div. 1976),
afl'd, 154 N.J. Super. 407, 381 A.2d 805 (App. Div. 1977) (no seat belts or roll bar in
army jeep).
" Obviously, different considerations apply in the case of a civilian bystander who
is injured or whose property is injured by virtue of a military aircraft crash. Such
concerns are beyond the scope of this article.
STRICT LIABILITY
ity of a manufacturer for harm caused by its defective pro-
ducts is required by this public interest.2 It is also possible,
however, that the injured party may be compensated by the
government through either service disability benefits if a ser-
viceman,26 or the Federal Tort Claims Act 27 if a civilian.
A recognition of the realities of the military aircraft manu-
facturing process must temper the urge to impose the doctrine
of strict tort liability. It is inconsistent with sound public pol-
icy to impose strict tort liability on manufacturers of military
hardware for damages resulting from defects in product de-
sign when manufacturers have limited power to control the
design process. Certainly, the imposition of liability would
have a chilling effect on the manufacture of military hard-
ware. Fewer manufacturers may be desirous of producing mili-
tary hardware and costs of production would surely increase.28
To impose strict tort liability on manufacturers in the name
of safety works a severe injustice on such manufacturer's
when rigid product specifications imposed by the manufac-
turer's prime customers are the cause of the design defect.29
The policy considerations for imposition of the doctrine are
heavily outweighed by the repercussions that would result
from its imposition. Thus, the second rationale used to impose
See supra note 9.
10 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1221 (1976).
27 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976).
28 In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 506 F. Supp. 737 (E.D.N.Y.
1979), rev'd, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub noma, Chapman v. Dow
Chem. Co., 50 U.S.L.W. 3487 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1981). The Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals stated: "But the government also has an interest in the suppliers of its mate-
riel[sic]; imposition, for example, of strict liability as contended for by plaintiffs
would affect the government's ability to procure materiel [sic) without the exaction of
significantly higher prices, or the attachment of onerous conditons, or the demand of
indemnification or the like." 635 F.2d at 994. Plaintiffs alleged that the aggregate
claims exceeded the total assets of the named defendants. Id. at 989.
so See, In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 506 F. Supp. at 747, n. 5
(E.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd, 635 F.2d 987 (2nd Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom, Chapman
v. Dow Chem. Co., 50 U.S.L.W. 3487 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1981), (holding that the plaintiffs'
claims were not governed by federal common law.) The Federal District court in In
Re Agent Orange noted: "If potential liability increased dramatically, future war con-
tractors might attach conditions to the use of their products, or balk at supplying the
military with any products, whatsoever. Thus, the government's military capabilities
might be affected by this litigation." 506 F. Supp. at 747, n.5.
19831
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the doctrine of strict tort liability provides no support for the
inclusion of manufacturers of military aircraft and compo-
nents within the scope of the doctrine.
C. Representation of Safety
The third justification for imposing strict tort liability on
manufacturers is concerned with making the manufacturer
uphold both express and implied representations as to the
safety of the product which result from its sale."0 This ration-
ale necessarily assumes that the purchaser bought the product
as a result of representations made by the manufacturer. That
is not generally the case, however, when military aircraft are
purchased.
As was earlier pointed out, the aircraft purchaser is usually
the government which often is involved in the design of the
aircraft from the inception. Frequently, design compromises
are made by and between the government and the manufac-
turer during the development phase of the project. Prior to
the purchase of the aircraft, prototypes are tested to deter-
mine the suitability of their use for the prescribed purpose.
Clearly, in such circumstances the purchaser of military air-
craft does not solely rely upon the manufacturer's safety
representations.
Additionally, it is unlikely that the ultimate user, a mili-
tary pilot or crewman, relies on any representation of the
manufacturer. The member of the armed forces who is using
the product has received training as to the use of the product
from his own employer. This training is continual in the case
of military aircraft. The user of the product is highly skilled
and sophisticated.' Moreover, his decision to "use" the pro-
duct is not based on his own expectations of safety. It simply
does not logically follow that reliance by the purchaser or user
on the safety of features over which the manufacturer may
have no control should be used to impose strict tort liability
so See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
s See Littlehale v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 268 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y.




Likewise, the incentive to produce a safe product will not be
increased through imposition of strict tort liability. 2 This ra-
tionale is not applicable in cases involving manufacturers of
military aircraft for at least two reasons. First, it necessarily
assumes that the manufacturers otherwise would not produce
a safe product. 8 This assumption is clearly erroneous. There
are civilian versions of many military aircraft which are sold
to the public.3 4 Because the policy reasons for imposing the
doctrine of strict tort liability are applicable in cases involving
civilian versions of military aircraft, it simply does not follow
that the manufacturer has no incentive to produce a safe
product for the military. This conclusion is fortified by the
fact that the civilian version of an aircraft may have safety
features not present on its military counterpart. There is no
sound policy justification for imposing liability on the manu-
facturer for the lack of a safety device in a military aircraft
which the manufacturer's design personnel would have in-
stalled if they had been given a choice. The absence often is
attributable solely to a decision made by persons other than
the manufacturer.
The second reason that this rationale will not support im-
position of the doctrine in the case of military manufacturers
can be inferred from the first. No sound policy reason exists
for holding strict liable a manufacturer that could not incor-
porate safety devices into the product even if it desired to do
so."s Moreover, it has been argued that since the government
is involved deeply in inspection and testing, the manufacturer
:2 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
03 The rationale also assumes that a manufacturer is compelled to produce a safe
product by threat of liability which is not necessarily the case. See PROSSER, supra
note 9, at 650.
Among the many examples of aircraft produced in both military and civilian
versions are the following: the Boeing Model 737 in the military version is T-43A; the
Beechcraft Super King Air 200 in the military version is C-12 and RU-21J; the
Beechcraft Baron Model 95-B55 in the military version is T-42A Cochise; and the
Bell Model 205 in the military version is UH-10H, EH-1H and HH-1H Iraquois.
JANE'S ALL THE WORLD'S AIRCRAFT 291, 276, 269, 278 (J. Taylor ed. 1980-81) [herein-
after cited as JANE'S].
" Kropp v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 329 F. Supp. 447, 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
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would have no incentive to use greater care because of the
governmental involvement in the matter."
D. Risk Allocation
The manufacturer, by purchasing liability insurance, gener-
ally can allocate the risk of harm equally among all purchas-
ers.87 In the case of military aircraft, however, there is initially
but one purchaser of the product, the federal government.
Any increase in cost resulting from obtaining liability insur-
ance would be passed on to the sole consumer. The amounts
spent on defense each year would be increased, thereby plac-
ing an increased drain on the Federal fisc.38 The imposition of
the doctrine of strict tort liability would require a decision to
either increase the total amount spent on defense or decrease
the number of products purchased. In so doing, the courts
would indirectly affect the government's discretionary power
to make war by forcing a reevaluation of governmental deci-
sions with regard to design."
The number of aircraft sold by the manufacturer to the
government is limited.4 0 Therefore the risk is spread over
fewer products, sold to a single purchaser, increasing the
amount allocated to cover insurance costs for each item.
These costs could be quite high because many of the aircraft
remain in service for extended periods of time." In light of
the foregoing, it can hardly be said that an "allocation of risk"
will occur with regard to the sale of military aircraft. In reality
what occurs is an increase in defense spending.
s0 Challoner v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 512 F.2d 77, 84 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated,
423 U.S. 3 (1976).
87 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 26-27.
8" Id. For a similar argument in a non-military setting see Hunt v. Balsius, 55 Ill.
App. 3d 14, 370 N.E.2d 617 (1977), afl'd, 74 Ill. 2d 203, 384 N.E.2d 368 (1978).
40 For example, of the aircraft listed in JANE'S, the armed services had accepted
delivery of 19 T-43A, 117 C-12 and RU-21J, 70 T42-A Cochise and 1269 UH-1H Air-
craft. JANE'S, supra note 34, at 295.
" See, JANE'S, supra note 34, at 295. For example, two versions of the the B-52 are
currently being used by the armed forces. It is estimated that 300 of those planes will
be used for the remainder of the century.
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E. Stand Behind Products
Finally, the business policy that manufacturers should
stand behind their products has been used to support imposi-
tion of the doctrine of strict liability.42 The position of the
manufacturer of military products, however, is different from
that of a manufacturer of products sold to consumers in the
"usual" course of business. The military manufacturer may be
required by the government to produce a product that does
not have all the secondary or safety features that the manu-
facturer believes are desirable. Certainly, the government has
the ability to make such decisions by virtue of its broad war
powers." While the manufacturer may request that certain
safety features be placed on aircraft sold and delivered to the
government, if the government rejects their inclusion, the
manufacturer is then powerless to protect itself from liability
should strict liability be imposed. To impose liability with
knowledge of such a distinction in the method and manner of
production works a manifest injustice and severely taxes the
outermost limits of the doctrine.
F. Summary
An examination of the six most frequently cited reasons
supporting the imposition of strict liability on manufacturers
of products discloses that none provides a sufficient justifica-
tion for imposing the doctrine in cases involving military air-
craft or components, especially in the design context. The re-
alities of the design process differ from the "usual" method of
product development. When coupled with the unique market
for military aircraft, the imposition of strict tort liability on
the manufacturers of military aircraft is clearly suspect.
Courts, therefore, should be willing to reject the application of
" See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
40 See supra note 38. See also Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 144 N.J. Super 1, 364
A.2d 43 (Law Div. 1976), aff'd, 154 N.J. Super 407, 381 A.2d 805 (App. Div. 1977).
"The procurement of military equipment by the Government is made pursuant to its
war powers and its inherent right and obligation to maintain an adequate defense
posture. In carrying out its responsibilities the Government must be given wide lati-
tude in its decision-making process." 364 A.2d at 47.
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the doctrine, even in this day of consumer protectionism.
Given the differences which exist between actions for injuries
caused to military personnel by military products and the
"typical" products liability action, there must be room for re-
examination of the applicability of the doctrine in this area.
To find such room, however, a careful study of the reported
decisions either involving or discussing the application of
strict liability to a manufacturer of military products is
necessary.
II. COURT DECISIONS
Surprisingly, few decisions deal squarely with the question
of whether strict tort liability should apply to manufacturers
of military products. Of particular interest is Lindsay v. Mc-
Donnell Douglas Aircraft Corporation," an admiralty action
which arose out of the crash of a F4B aircraft into the Gulf of
Mexico during a training flight. On appeal, judgment in favor
of the manufacturer was reversed and the cause remanded for
reconsideration of the previously rejected strict liability
claim.4
Initially, the court observed that:
While the doctrine of strict liability in tort (often referred to as
the doctrine of implied warranty) at its inception did not have
the wide acceptance which would justify its incorporation into
the general maritime law, it has gained general acceptance in
the intervening years and has been incorporated in admiralty
law.
We think now that the doctrine of strict liability in tort is
part of the general maritime law and is thus available to this
Plaintiff under the Death on the High Seas Act, which applies
Federal Admiralty law ...
We hold that the correct law to be applied in this case is
expressed in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965), as
it is the best expression of the doctrine as it is generally ap-
plied, and for the additional reason that several federal courts
" 460 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 1972), rev'g, 331 F. Supp. 257 (E.D. Mo. 1971), on re-
mand, 352 F. Supp. 633 (E.D. Mo.), aff'd, 485 F.2d 1288 (8th Cir. 1973).
,1 460 F.2d at 640.
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have previously used that section in maritime cases [citations
omitted] ."6
The policy reasons, if any, for imposing the doctrine of strict
liability on a manufacturer of military aircraft were not ex-
amined by the court in its analysis, probably because the ar-
gument was not advanced. The court limited its holding to an
affirmation of the availability of strict tort liability in admi-
ralty actions.47 While some courts may use Lindsay as a
springboard for applying the doctrine to manufacturers of
military aircraft, the holding should not be extended beyond
the limited recognition that strict liability is available in gen-
eral maritime law.
There are two decisions, however, which address the ques-
tion of whether strict tort liability should be applied as a mat-
ter of public policy to the manufacturers of military hardware.
The first decision is Foster v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc.,' in
which the plaintiff received serious injuries as a result of the
explosion of a hand grenade during a training exercise. The
manufacturer of the ordnance contended that the doctrine of
strict liability was not applicable because both the fuse and
the grenade had been manufactured exclusively for and on be-
half of the government.' e Additionally, neither the fuse nor
the grenade had entered the stream of commerce. Although
the court recognized that several of the justifications for im-
position of the doctrine of strict tort liability were not pre-
sent, it nevertheless allowed application of the doctrine.
' Id. at 636 (citations omitted).
I7 d. "We think now that the doctrine of strict liability in tort is a part of the
general maritime law and it is thus ayailable to this plaintiff under the Death on the
High Seas Act, which applies federal admiralty law." Id.
502 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1974).
,'Id. at 871. The court noted:
The defendants urge that, even if Iowa law is controlling, it was not
proper to apply strict liability under the facts present here. Their ar-
gument is based upon their belief that neither the fuse nor the grenade
in question were placed in the stream of commerce since they were
manufactured exclusively for and on behalf of the United States Gov-
ernment. Thus, they urge, one of the primary justifications for the doc-
trine of strict liability, that of the public's interest in insuring that
only safe products are placed in the stream of commerce, is absent.
19831
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In making the grenade and its component parts defendants
knew that it was made for military personnel and that it was to
be used by them. We believe the public interest in human life
and health requires the protection of the law against the manu-
facturer of defective explosives, whether they are to be used by
members of the public at large or members of the public serv-
ing in our armed forces. It is true that the defendants here did
not solicit the use of their product, yet they most certainly did
reap the profits from its production.8
There was no further discussion of the policy justifications for
the imposition of the doctrine of strict tort liability on the
manufacturers of ordnance.
In another matter involving the same defendant, Challoner
v. Day and Zimmermann, Inc.,51 the Fifth Circuit faced the
issue of whether the doctrine of strict liability should apply to
the manufacturer of a military ordnance. In Challoner a how-
itzer shell exploded prematurely. The court again applied the
doctrine of strict liability.
In one respect, defendants are no doubt correct; not all of the
reasons that have justified the move to strict liability are pre-
sent here. However, the most basic and primary justification
for imposing strict liability is present. "The purpose of such
liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from
defective products are born by manufacturers that put such
products on the market rather than by the injured persons who
are powerless to protect themselves," [citation omitted. 52
Thereafter, the court cited with approval the rationale
adopted in Foster." In effect, both of these decisions adopted
the rationale that the manufacturer is in a better position to
spread the risk of loss caused by defects in products.
As was pointed out earlier in this article, however, this ra-
tionale does not justify the imposition of strict tort liability on
manufacturers of military aircraft. The manufacturer cannot
50 Id.
51 512 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated, 423 U.S. 3 (1976), on remand, 546 F.2d 26
(5th Cir. 1977).
"* Id. at 84.
3 Id. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
STRICT LIABILITY
spread the risk of loss among the buyers when there is but one
buyer, the federal government. Any increase of costs to cover
the increased risk of loss caused by application of the doctrine
falls on that one buyer. Not only does this place a burden on
the federal exchequer, but also upon the manufacturers of
military equipment."' Thus, while it is true that the foregoing
decisions did adopt the doctrine of strict liability in situations
involving the manufacturers of military equipment, the ra-
tionale employed in these decisions should be viewed with a
jaundiced eye because it fails to recognize the economic reali-
ties involved.
An additional reason for questioning the applicability of the
rationale underlying the Foster and Challoner decisions as
justification for imposition of the doctrine of strict liability on
manufacturers of military aircraft is that the government, as
purchaser, often decides what safety features will be incorpo-
rated into the aircraft design. Thus, a manufacturer of a mili-
tary aircraft may be required to produce an aircraft which
does not have otherwise desirable safety features. When a
manufacturer carefully produces an aircraft in accordance
with government specifications, any defect existing in the
product is often a result of a design consideration rather than
defective manufacture. Although the court did not so hold, in
Foster the primary issue presented was whether the manufac-
turer should be held liable for damages attributible to a defec-
tively manufactured product.5 5 The plaintiff's claims, how-
ever, were not based on an assertion that a defect in design
rendered the hand grenade unreasonably dangerous.
It is more difficult to advance policy reasons supporting re-
jection of the application of the doctrine of strict liability
when actions and events occurring during the manufacturing
or assembly process result in production of an unreasonably
dangerous product. In that situation, a plaintiff might persua-
sively argue that the manufacturer is clearly culpable and
" See supra notes 26 and 27.
D See Foster v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 502 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1974). "The gov-
ernment's specifications did not call for the defendants to assemble a defectively
made grenade." Id.
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should bear the cost of injuries caused by the unreasonably
dangerous product. A manufacturer's culpability is less clear,
however, when it has carefully manufactured a product pursu-
ant to another person's defective plan or design."
Critics will argue that the Challoner court rejected the view
that manufacturers who follow defective designs of another
should not be held liable under a strict liability theory. Such
contentions, however, cannot withstand careful scrutiny. In
Challoner, the court held only that it was not error to instruct
the jury that the defect in the product could arise from either
a defect in manufacture or a defect in design. 7 The decision
should not be extended beyond that holding.
Finally, there is a distinction to be drawn between the situ-
ation involving manufacturers of military ordnance and that
involving manufacturers of military aircraft. Military ord-
nance products may be used by persons other than the mili-
tary such as governmental agencies. For example, governmen-
tal entities involved in law enforcement may use tear gas or
smoke bombs which were manufactured for the military. It is
highly unlikely, though, that such agencies would use military
" Moon v. Winger Boss Co., Inc., 205 Neb. 292, 287 N.W.2d 430 (1980). See also
cases cited infra note 113. RESATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 404 (1964).
51 See Challoner v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 512 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated,
423 U.S. 3 (1976). The jury was instructed that a product defect could arise in two
manners: (1) from some miscarriage in the construction or assembly process; or (2)
from the design of the product. Defendants claimed the instruction created error be-
cause the design was exclusively in the control of the government, not the defendants.
Defendants claimed no liability for injuries to others caused by a defective design
arose unless the design was so glaringly dangerous that they should have known of
the defective design. Id. at 82-83. See, e.g., Ryan v. Fenney & Sheehan Bldg. Co., 239
N.Y. 43, 145 N.E. 321 (1924). The court rejected this argument stating:
The difficulty with this argument is that the cited cases which absolve
defendants who follow defective designs of another were not decided
under a strict liability theory. They involved attempts to demonstrate
negligence and stand only for the proposition that there is no negli-
gence in following the design of another unless the design is such that
the defectiveness was sufficiently obvious to alert a reasonably compe-
tent technician to the danger.
In this case, it was not necessary to prove negligence. The theory
alleged was strict liability which, unlike negligence, does not require




aircraft in pursuit of their duties.
The broader use of military ordnance may provide a sound
policy reason for imposing strict liability in tort on the manu-
facturers of such products, even in cases involving defective
design. Broad usage is not present, however, in the case of
military aircraft which generally are used only by military
personnel in the performance of military operations. Never-
theless, it can be argued that all matters involving military
ordnance are different from the "typical" products liability
claims.
For example, in Littlehale v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co.,58 recovery was sought from the manufacturer of blasting
caps. The plaintiff alleged that the manufacturer negligently
failed to warn of inherent dangers in the use of the product.
In determining there was no duty to warn, the court stated as
follows:
In considering the applicable law, it is at least helpful to recog-
nize this case for what it is not. It is not a case involving a
product manufactured for sale or resale to the general public.
It is not a case involving negligence in the manufacture, design
or use of materials. It is not a case where the manufacturer
had any freedom of choice as to manufacture, design, or use of
materials. It is not a case where evidence has been submitted
upon which foreseeability of the particular use involved herein
could be predicated. It is not a case involving a product such as
a heating brick, paint, agricultural or horticultural germicide or
similar product, or other material which, while inherently dan-
gerous in connection with certain uses, is not generally known
to be so. It is a case where the product is manufactured during
wartime in accordance with detailed specifications for use by
a particular branch of the government, namely, Ordnance (or
the Corps of Engineers as indicated on the containers); the
user was as well or more fully informed of the hazards involved
in the correct methods of use as was the manufacturer; the
product, if not used by the originally intended user, was never-
theless used by an employee of the government - i.e., a civil-
ian employee of the Navy; and no evidence has been offered
" 268 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), afl'd, 380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1967).
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upon which a jury could find that the particular use (or user)
involved herein was foreseeable by the manufacturer.8 9
Although the case arose in an action involving negligence, the
logic is equally applicable in cases involving strict tort liability
claims.6 0
No reported decision has yet held a manufacturer of mili-
tary aircraft strictly liable based on its status as manufac-
turer. In cases involving ordnance manufacturers, strict liabil-
ity in tort has been applied primarily on the theory that the
manufacturer is in the best position to assume and spread the
risk of loss.61 Given the differences which exist between the
"typical" products liability action and an action involving a
product manufactured for military use, this rationale hardly
seems to support imposition of the doctrine in most ordnance
cases, much less in actions involving manufacturers of military
aircraft.
It is unlikely that any court would readily hold that the
doctrine of strict tort liability is per se inapplicable to a man-
ufacturer of military hardware. Courts may be willing, how-
ever, to allow manufacturers of certain military hardware,
such as aircraft and their components wider latitude with re-
gard to defending such actions given the differences which ex-
ist between those manufacturers and the manufacturer of a
"typical" product. In that regard, examination of alternatives
which may be available to the manufacturer of military pro-
ducts, especially in the design area, is appropriate.
69 Id. at 801-03 (emphasis added).
" Cf. Challoner v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 523 F.2d 77, 82-83 (5th Cir. 1975).
" Id. at 84 n.2.
However, the most basic and primary justification for imposing strict
liability is present. "The purpose of such liability is to insure that the
costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the
manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by
the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves," Foster v.
Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 8 Cir., 1974, 502 F.2d 867, 871, [sic] quoting
Hawkeye-Security Insurance Company v. Ford Motor Company, 174
N.W. 2d 672 (Iowa, 1970) [sic], which takes the quote from the leading
strict liability case of Greenbaum [sic] v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,




III. ALTERNATIVES FOR THE MANUFACTURER
A. Contractual Indemnity
Prior to Stencel Aero Engineering Corporation v. United
States," which held that a third party indemnity claim was
unavailable to a manufacturer despite the manufacturer's
claims that the federal government was primarily liable for
the malfunctioning system, several decisions suggested the use
of contractual indemnity as an alternative basis for imposing
liability upon the government in a third party action. Those
cases arose under compensation acts which precluded tort in-
demnity by removing any underlying liability between the in-
jured party and the potential indemnifier. Because an ex-
press contract to indemnify is rarely present in such
situations, most defendants argue that an implied contract or
an implied warranty of indemnification exists." This concept
probably originated in Ryan Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Pan At-
-- 431 U.S. 666 (1977). The result was limited to a decision involving the Federal
Tort Claims Act. Such limitation should not be viewed as extending the holding to
claims for indemnification in all instances. In that regard, see Barr v. Brezina Con-
struction Co., 464 F.2d 1141, 1143 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
63 The exclusive liability section of the Federal Employee's Compensation Act
(FECA), is 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (1976). FECA cases in which a third party defendant
seeks indemnity against the government as a third party defendant parallel the mili-
tary decisions are which discussed below. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. United
States, 493 F.2d 881, 887-88 (3rd Cir. 1974); Wien Alaska Airlines Inc. v. United
States , 375 F.2d 736, 737 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 940 (1967); United Air
Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379, 404 (9th Cir.), cert. dism'd sub nom., United
Airlines Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 951 (1964). These cases also infer that the
absence of underlying tort liability on behalf of the government is not a per se bar to
the question of government indemnification and contribution in both the military and
FECA contexts. See Dombrick, The Right to Collect Contribution or Indeminity
From the United States When a Federal Employee or Serviceman Is Injured, 27
JAG J. 69 (Fall 1972). See also Note, Contribution and Indemnity Under the Fed-
eral Employee Compensation Act, 6 TOL. L. Rav. 273 (1974).
The exclusive liability provision of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Com-
pensation Act (LHWCA) is found at 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1976). See, e.g., American Pres-
ident Lines, Ltd. v. Marine Terminals Corp., 234 F.2d 753 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 926 (1956); Crawford v. Pope & Talbot, 206 F.2d 784, 792 (3d Cir. 1953).
Likewise this idea is recognized by state workmen's compensation acts. See, e.g.,
Atella v. General Elec. Co., 21 F.R.D. 372, 374 (D.R.I. 1957); C&L Rural Elec. Co-op
Corp. v. Kincaid, 221 Ark. 450, 256 S.W.2d 337 (1953).
" See supra note 63.
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lantic Steamship Corp.65
Ryan involved an action under the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Worker's Compensation Act (LHWCA) 66 arising out
of the injury of a stevedore's employee while on board the
shipowner's vessel. The shipowner had secured the stevedore
to perform all such operations required by the shipowner's
coastwise service during 1949; however, neither a formal steve-
doring contract nor an express indemnity agreement was en-
tered into between the shipowner and the stevedore.17 In com-
pliance with the agreement, the stevedore loaded one of the
shipowner's vessels. The loading of the hatch where the acci-
dent later occurred was supervised by the stevedore's hatch
foreman while the shipowner's cargo officers, who had author-
ity to reject unsafe stowage, simultaneously supervised the
loading of the entire ship." Upon arrival of the vessel at its
destination, the stevedore engaged in unloading the cargo, at
which time the stevedore's employee was seriously injured."
Pursuant to his option under the LHWCA, the injured em-
ployee brought suit against the shipowner, alleging either that
the unsafe stowage of the cargo established the unseaworthi-
ness of the ship or that the shipowner was negligent in failing
to furnish him with a safe place to work, or both.7 0 The shi-
powner filed a third party complaint against the stevedore,
which the court later dismissed because a jury in a prior pro-
ceeding had returned a $75,000 verdict for the employee. 1
The dismissal of the third party indemnity claim was reversed
on appeal.7 2 After granting certiorari, the United States Su-
- 350 U.S. 124 (1956). Ryan was legislatively overruled in 1972 by the enactment
of 33 U.S.C. § 905. However, that legislation is only applicable to the LHWCA. The
concepts announced in Ryan, being judicial in nature, are still appropriate and viable.
See also Edmonds v. Compagnie Gen. Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256 (1979).
" Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, 33 U.S. §§ 901-950
(1976).








preme Court examined whether the exclusive liability provi-
sions of the LHWCA precluded the shipowner's claim for re-
imbursement from the stevedore and, if not, whether such
liability could exist without an express agreement of indem-
nity.78 Initially, the Court observed that the LHWCA did not
expressly preclude or limit the shipowner's right to insure it-
self against such liability. Therefore, the Court concluded that
although a third party is not subject to tort liability under the
LHWCA, the third party could not avoid a voluntarily as-
sumed independent contractual obligation to properly load
the cargo.7 4 The Court further held that an express indemnity
agreement was unnecessary after finding that the agreement
between the shipowner and the stevedore necessarily included
both the stevedore's obligation to stow the cargo and his obli-
gation to stow it properly. According to the Court, a warranty
of workmanlike service arose, the breach of which could not
be defeated by the shipowner's failure to discover and correct
such breach.5
To fully understand Ryan one must look at the context in
which it arose. Ryan was decided after several Supreme Court
cases clarified the relationship between the vessel owner and
stevedore. In the first of these cases, Seas Shipping Co. v.
Sieracki, 76 longshoremen were held to be "seamen" insofar as
that status made them persons to whom shipowners owe an
absolute duty to provide a seaworthy ship. This absolute duty
was not founded on fault because of the unusual hazards asso-
ciated with maritime service, the inability of the seaman to
secure his own safety and the harshness of potential individ-
ual loss. The second case, Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceil-
ing & Refitting Corp.,77 was a non-collision maritime injury
71 Id. at 125.
7, Id. at 130-31.
76 Id. at 133-35. The court was careful to limit its holding to a finding that the
LHWCA did not preclude contractual recovery. The court did not reach the issue of
whether or not the exclusivity clause of the LHWCA could bar a shipowner under
comparable circumstances where there was no indemnity or service agreement, recog-
nizing such would lead to the concepts of active-passive or primary-secondary tor-
tious conduct. Id. at 133 n.6.
76 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
71 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
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case in which the Court negated contribution from the shore-
side contractor employer as a joint tortfeasor despite the fact
that the unseaworthy condition was the result of the com-
bined fault of the shipowner and the stevedoring company.
The court reasoned that the rule concerning contribution
among joint tortfeasors was a matter for the legislature and
not the judiciary.
These cases combined to put the shipowner in the unenvi-
able position of being held liable for the entire amount of a
longshoreman's compensatory damage even where the un-
seaworthy condition was created wholly by the negligence of
the stevedoring company. Further, since the LHWCA elimi-
nated the longshoreman's recovery in tort against the steve-
doring company, the longshoreman had to seek tort redress
against the shipowner. Recognizing this dilemma, the Court in
Ryan fashioned an implied warranty of workmanlike perform-
ance and the resulting indemnification of the shipowner.78
A comparison between the shipowner in the Ryan context
and the manufacturer of aircraft in the government contract
context is instructive. The shipowner's non-delegable, abso-
lute duty resulted from judicial determination, as has the
manufacturer's duty under the ever expanding doctrine of
strict liability. As with the stevedoring company , a corre-
sponding duty of indemnity should devolve upon the govern-
ment in instances in which it fails to perform reasonably its
contractual obligations. Most obviously, where the govern-
ment provides specifications, requirements or components, as
was alleged by the manufacturer in Stencel Aero, a warranty
akin to the stevedore's warranty of workmanlike service
should arise.7 9 In such a case, the government has agreed to
perform services for the benefit of the manufacturer for which
it otherwise would have been absolutely responsible. Critics of
such a theory will argue that the Ryan indemnity doctrine
must be limited to the maritime context, and several circuits
78 350 U.S. at 133. See supra note 65.




Others will argue that the manufacturer's position is more
closely aligned to that of the stevedore in Ryan since the
Ryan court likened the warranty of workmanlike service to a
manufacturer's warranty of the soundness of the manufac-
tured product.81 In reality, however, the government is the
party in a position analogous to that of the Ryan stevedore
since the breach of a warranty or the design defect in the
product flows from the government's culpability and not that
of the product manufacturer.
The Ryan indemnity doctrine is equitable and there are no
reasons why it should not be applied and adopted to other
situations when equitable relief is appropriate. Finally, the
theory of contractual indemnity will not interfere with the
doctrine announced in Feres v. United States.82 In the first
instance, contractual indemnity works outside the parameters
of exclusive compensation schemes such as the Veteran's Ben-
efit Act.8 Secondly, federal rather than state law is applied in
construing government contracts." Thus, the "distinctively
federal" relationship between the government and its suppli-
ers of military hardware will not be influenced by state law.
As to the question of military discipline, no court or govern-
ment attorney can seriously contend that a contractual dis-
pute between the government and its suppliers would under-
mine discipline in the armed services. Thus, the theory of
contractual indemnity seems to present a viable alternative to
the imposition of the doctrine of strict liability in matters in-
so Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 472 F.2d 69 (6th Cir. 1972); Barr v.
Brezina Corp., 464 F.2d 1141 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973);
Smith Petroleum Service, Inc. v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 420 F.2d 1103, 1107 (5th Cir.
1970); Schwartz v. Compagnie Gen. Transatlantique, 405 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1968). For
cases applying Ryan in a non-admiralty context, see, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Moretz,
270 F.2d 780 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied sub nom., Mason-Dixon Lines, Inc. v. Gen-
eral Elec. Co., 361 U.S. 964 (1960); Atella v. General Elec. Co., 21 F.R.D. 372 (D.R.I.
1957).
'I Ryan Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 133-
34 (1956).
" 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
,' Veteran's Benefit Act, 38 U.S.C. §§ 1-5228 (1976).
Woodbury v. United States, 313 F.2d 291, 295 (9th Cir. 1963). See also Clearfield
Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943).
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volving military equipment.
B. The Equitable Credit
In Murray v. United States,8 a government employee was
injured in a falling elevator located in a building owned by
Murray but leased by the United States. The government em-
ployee received benefits under the FECA and then brought
suit against Murray for his negligence as the owner. Murray
filed two separate third party claims against the United States
claiming a right to contribution and indemnity.8 6 The court
held that the contribution claim was precluded by the FECA
since, as a general rule, workmen's compensation statutes ter-
minate the employer's common law tort liability by substitut-
ing a duty to pay a prescribed compensation which is not
based on fault.8 7 The court noted that any inequity caused by
the denial of contribution was mitigated by the rule recog-
nized in that jurisdiction, which held that where one joint
tortfeasor causes injury by compromising a claim, the other
tortfeasor, who cannot obtain contribution from the tortfeasor
who has "bought his peace," will be protected by reducing his
tort judgment by one-half on the theory that the plaintiff sold
one-half of his claim when he made the settlement.8 The
court then stated:
In our situation if the building owner is held liable the dam-
ages payable should be limited to one-half of the amount of
damages sustained by plaintiff assuming the facts would have
entitled the owner to contribution from the employer if the
statute had not interposed a bar. A tortfeasor jointly responsi-
ble with an employer is not compelled to pay the total common
law damages. The common law recovery of the injured em-
88 405 F.2d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
The contractual indemnity claim was dismissed as beyond the court's jurisdic-
tion on the basis of the Tucker Act which limits the district court's jurisdiction in
cases "not exceeding $10,000 in amount .. " Id. at 1366-67. The noncontractual
indemnity claim was dismissed on the ground that the third party plaintiff's com-
plaint could not fairly be read so as to state a claim for noncontractual indemnity. Id.
at 1367.
87 Id. at 1364.
Id. at 1365. See Martello v. Hawley, 300 F.2d 721, 724 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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ployee is thus reduced in consequence of the employee's com-
pensation act, but that act gave him assurance of compensation
even in the absence of fault.
89
Thus, the "Murray credit" was born in a modern attempt to
adjust equitably the burden of the third party plaintiff.
The issue of the Murray credit continues to arise in the
context of the LHWCA. 0 There was a split of authority on
the propriety of such a credit under the 1972 amendments to
the LHWCA. Even those courts favoring the credit theory
have suggested application of an "equitable credit" as op-
posed to the concededly arbitrary fifty percent reduction re-
quired by Murray."' The Ninth Circuit, in Dodge v. Mitsui
Shintaka Ginko K.K. Tokyo" and Shellman v. United States
Lines, Inc.,93 has rejected credit theories on various grounds.
Foremost, it was recognized that the existing inequity would
not be solved by shifting it to the shoulders of the longshore-
man whose recovery under the equitable credit theory, would
be diminished in most instances where his employer was neg-
69 405 F.2d at 1365-66.
90 One article notes that an equitable credit in admiralty had been attempted some
twenty years prior to the Murray decision. Coleman & Daly, Equitable Credit: Ap-
portionment of Damages According to Fault in Tripartite Litigation Under the 1972
Amendments to the Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, 35
MD. L. REv. 351, 384 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Coleman & Daly]. In Baccile v.
Halcyon Lines, 187 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1951), a harborworker proceeded against a ship-
owner who sought contribution from the harborworker's employer whose negligence
had concurred in causing the employee's injuries. The Third Circuit allowed contribu-
tion from the employer but only to the extent of its workman's compensation liability
under the LWHCA. Id. at 404. However, in Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling &
Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 284-85 (1952), the Supreme Court found that no right
to contribution existed in non-collision cases. It should be noted, however, that North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, California and New York all have adopted equitable reme-
dies for the third party plaintiff seeking reduction in its liability by virtue of an em-
ployer's negligence. Coleman & Daly, supra, at 382-86; See, Cohen & Dogherty, The
1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act:
An Opportunity for Equitable Uniformity in Tripartite Industrial Accident Litiga-
tion, 19 N.Y.L.F. 587, 599-602 (1974). See also Coleman, The 1972 Amendments to
the LHWCA: Life Expectancy of an Equitable Credit, 12 FORUM 683 (1977).
" The term "equitable credit" actually comes from the district court decision in
Frasca v. Prudential-Grace Lines, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Md. 1975) (question of
equitable credit mooted by reversal in favor of the defendant).
:2 528 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1975),cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
3 528 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976).
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ligent9 4 A subsidiary concern was that allowance of a credit in
favor of the third party plaintiff would negate Congressional
intent to eliminate, through the 1972 amendments to the Act,
direct or indirect third party actions in longshoremens' injury
cases.9 5 The Ninth Circuit also stated that amendment of the
LHWCA, so as to remove any inequities, should be done by
Congress and not the courts."
The Fourth Circuit analyzed each of these arguments in
Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,7 and con-
cluded that a credit is permissible. The decision of the court
of appeals however, was reversed by the Supreme Court on
three grounds.8 First, the Court stated that the legislative
conflict seen by the lower court was largely of its own crea-
tion.9 9 The Court concluded that Congress did not alter the
judicially created rule holding the shipowner liable for all
damages not caused by the longshoreman's negligence.100
While acknowledging that strong arguments exist for the im-
position of a proportionate-fault rule as adopted by the lower
court, the majority refused to adopt such a rule because of
Congressional action in reliance on judicially-created law.101
The dissent advanced a proportionate-fault rule in a
strongly worded opinion which argued that the rule adhered
to by the majority was unfair and unjust.1 02 The dissent sug-
gested that the better approach would be to allow the injured
longshoreman to recover damages for that portion of the in-
jury for which the shipowner was responsible through its neg-
528 F.2d at 672; 528 F.2d at 680.
9" 528 F.2d at 672; 528 F.2d at 680. See also Hubbard v. Great Pacific Shipping
Co., 404 F. Supp. 1242, 1244 (D. Ore. 1975); Lucas v. "Brinknes" Schiffahrts Ges., 379
F. Supp. 759, 769 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
" 528 F.2d at 672-73; 528 F.2d at 680-81. See also Santino v. Liberian Distance
Transp., Inc., 405 F. Supp. 34, 35 (W.D. Wash. 1975); Lucas v. "Brinknes" Schiffahrts
Ges., 379 F.Supp. 759, 769 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
558 F.2d 186 (4th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 443 U.S. 256 (1979).
98 443 U.S. 256 (1979).
Id. at 263.
Id. at 271.
,01 Id. at 273.
300 Id. at 280. "Under the Court's rule, the longshoreman is guaranteed statutory
compensation without regard to fault and is given a risk-free chance to obtain full
damages if the ship owner is found negligent in even the slightest degree." Id.
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ligence, with the balance of the damages to be recovered in
the form of statutory compensation. 10 3 Finally, the dissent
chastised the majority for unnecessarily deferring to Congress
in an area properly subject to judicial instruction. 10
Although the equitable credit imposed by the lower court
was not adopted by the Court in Edmonds that result ob-
tained simply because the majority felt that Congress had re-
lied upon what it understood the law to be in 1972 when Ryan
was legislatively overruled.10 5 The majority of the Court, while
recognizing that an equitable credit would be applicable in the
other situations refused to apply the principle in Edmonds
solely because of the specific Congressional enactment. 101 It is
still unclear, however, whether an equitable credit will be im-
posed in situations where a manufacturer of military aircraft
is saddled with liability for all of a serviceman's injuries de-
spite a finding that the government is partially or even pri-
marily at fault. While the existence of the "Murray credit"
was recognized in Stencel Aero,0 7 no attempt was made to
apply it to the facts in that case.
Whether seeking application of the fifty-percent "Murray
credit" or some kind of pro tanto "equitable credit," the man-
ufacturer will be met with arguments similar to those posited
against the application of a credit in the LHWCA cases. 0 8
Servicemen may argue that they will be penalized if damage
recoveries against a manufacturer are reduced according to
the United States' proportionate fault. The serviceman, how-
ever, has no inherent right to recover from the manufacturer
damages caused by torts attributable to the United States.
Like the longshoreman, the serviceman receives the quid pro
quo of no fault recovery in exchange for acceptance of a lesser
amount in damages. Furthermore, the granting of an equita-
ble credit in the LHWCA cases is not complicated by lien
:0 Id. at 280 n.5 (citing Coleman & Daly, supra note 90).
", 433 U.S. at 281.
105 Id. at 273. See supra note 65.
'" See Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 271-73
(1979).
11 431 U.S. at 670.
108 See generally supra notes 83-86 and note 91.
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problems. Although the U.S. Government is granted a lien for
the recovery of expenses incurred in rendering medical care
and treatment in cases involving third party liability,'0 9 the
LHWCA specifically excludes from its terms all such care and
treatment rendered pursuant to the Veteran's Benefit Act for
service-connected disabilities. 10
Finally, problems attending the application of an equitable
credit in LHWCA cases, including circuity of actions and pro-
cedural problems of binding the third party,"' will not be pre-
sent when the credit is imposed in military hardware cases.
The rights of the government and servicemen will still be reg-
ulated by the Veteran's Benefit Act, while the common law
action against a manufacturer will still be governed by tort
principles. No overlap will occur. In effect, the plaintiff will
recover compensation benefits under the Veteran's Benefit
Act and still be free to pursue the manufacturer; however, any
recovery against the manufacturer will be reduced by the per-
centage of fault attributable to the government.
C. Reliance on Government Specifications, Requirements
or Components As a Possible Defense
In negligence actions it is generally held that an indepen-
dent contractor, or a manufacturer, is not liable to third per-
sons for injuries received due to defective construction or
manufacture if the construction was completed in accordance
with plans and specifications submitted by the employer, and
the design defect was not so obviously dangerous that a rea-
sonable contractor would not follow the plans." 2 This defense
may provide little comfort to most manufacturers of military
aircraft, since claims against them often involve theories of
:09 42 U.S.C. §§ 2651-2653 (1976).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2651(c) (1976).
. See Coleman, supra note 90, at 400-02.
". Person v. Cauldwell-Wingate Co., 187 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1951), cert denied, 341
U.S. 936; Davis v. Henerlog Lumber Co., 211 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Ind. 1963); Ryan v.
Feeney & Sheehan Bldg. Co., 239 N.Y. 43, 145 N.E. 321 (1924). See also Littlehale v.
E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 268 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), afl'd, 380 F.2d
274 (2d Cir. 1967); Moon v. Winger Boss Co., Inc., 205 Neb. 292, 287 N.W.2d 430
(1980).
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strict liability as well as negligence. There is some indication,
however, that this rationale may be utilized in the strict liabil-
ity context as well.
In Sanner v. Ford Motor Co.,113 the plaintiff was injured in
a collision involving the army jeep in which he was riding. He
brought suit against the defendant manufacturer of the vehi-
cle alleging that the defendant should have installed safety
belts in the vehicle. 11 4 Summary judgment was granted in the
trial court upon alternative bases, one being that the defen-
dant manufactured the jeep in strict compliance with the gov-
ernment's specifications. 15 The appellate court affirmed,
agreeing that the manufacturer was shielded from liability
since it had no discretion with respect to the installation of
seat belts and had adhered strictly to government specifica-
tions."' Recognizing that the cases relied upon by the trial
court involved negligence, the appellate court stressed that
the underlying policy reasons for protecting the manufacturer
from liability are equally pertinent in the strict liability con-
text.11 7 The underlying policy reasons, expressed in the lower
court opinion, shifted the emphasis from the more narrow
"contract specification defense" to the broader "government
contract defense." ' Recognizing the interrelation between
Il 154 N.J. Super. 407, 381 A.2d 805 (Law Div. 1976) af'g, 144 N.J. Super. 1, 364
A.2d 43 (App. Div. 1977).
" 381 A.2d at 806. "The M151A [vehicle] was manufactured by defendant Ford in
strict compliance with contract plans and specifications owned by the United States
Government. Plaintiff maintained that the vehicle should have had seatbelts and that
the lack of such a safety device constituted a dangerous defect." Id.
'1 See, Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 144 N.J. Super. 1, 364 A.2d 43 (1976) af'g 154
N.J. Super. 407, 381 A.2d 805 (1977).
16 381 A.2d at 806. For a similar holding in military context, see Casabianca v.
Casabianca, 104 Misc. 2d 348, 428 N.Y.S. 2d 400 (1980) afl'd, 79 A.D. 2d 117, 436
N.Y.S.2d 907 (1981) (holding that manufacturer of dough mixer who produced the
mixer in compliance with military specifications during time of war had a complete
defense to an action to recover for injuries under theories of negligence, strict liability
or warranty).
381 A.2d at 806.
US Littlehale v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 268 F. Supp. 791, 802-05 n.15
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), afl'd, 380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1967). The "contract specification" de-
fense establishes a different test by which to judge the manufacturer who is not exer-
cising full discretion over the method of manufacture whereas the latter can serve as
a total insulation from liability.
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the two defenses, the trial court stressed that allowing liability
to attach to a contractor who followed government specifica-
tions would result in the contractor's raising the prices to
cover such risks and that such reaction by the contractor
would cause the Government's immunity from the conse-
quences of its acts in the performance of "discretionary func-
tions" to be of no value." 9
In Hunt v. Blasius Co.,120 the Illinois appellate court termed
the issue as being whether liability is precluded in any respect
in which a product complies with mandatory governmental
specifications and requirements. 1 I Relying on Littlehalel"
and Sanner, 1 3 the court concluded that the acts of a manu-
facturer, who had complied with government plans and speci-
fications as to the manufacture and installation of a roadside
sign, must be tested against a different standard from those of
a manufacturer who has sole discretion over the manner in
which the product is produced. 24 The theory underlying the
court's holding was that competitive bidding might come to a
halt should bidders fear legal action as a consequence of fol-
lowing government specifications; alternatively, bids might be
inflated to cover potential liability.'" Thus, according to the
court, public policy mandated that bidders who comply
strictly with government specifications be shielded from liabil-
ity in all respects in which the product complies.""
On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, the lower court
holding, recognizing the applicability of the independent con-
tractor rule 127 to the negligence count asserted by the plain-
"' 364 A.2d at 47.
55 Il. App. 2d 282, 370 N.E.2d 617 (App. Ct.), afl'd, 74 l.2d 203, 384 N.E.2d
368 (1978).
l 370 N.E.2d at 620.
"' See Littlehale v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 268 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y.
1966), afl'd 380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1967).
"' See Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 144 N.J. Super 1, 364 A.2d 43 (Law Div. 1976).
114 370 N.E.2d at 621-22.
Id. at 621.
Id. at 621-22.
"' Id. at 620-21. Paul Harris Furniture Co. v. Morse, 10 Il.2d 28, 40, 139 N.E.2d
275, 282-83 (1956), cited by the Court in Hunt, was dispositive on the application of
independent contractor liability in negligence actions:
The general rule is that where an independent contractor is employed
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tiff, was affirmed. 2 8 No mention was made, however, of the
applicability of the rule to the strict liability claim. The court
merely stated that in the absence of any fact which would in-
dicate that the post supporting the roadside sign subjected
motorists to any unreasonable or unexpected risks a cause of
action predicated on strict liability could not be sustained.'2 9
In Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 30 it was intimated that reason-
able behavior on the part of the manufacturer in relying upon
its customer's industrial expertise and in following the cus-
tomer's plans and specifications might not serve as a defense
for the manufacturer."' Use of Spangler as authority is weak-
ened by the context of the plaintiff's complaint, however, be-
cause it was predicated upon a negligence theory of liability.
Nonetheless, when the plaintiff attempted to amend his theo-
ries of recovery at the appellate level to include breach of war-
ranty and strict liability the court stated, "the standard of
safety imposed on the manufacturer of a product is essentially
the same whether the theory of liability is labeled warranty or
negligence or strict tort liability and under our view of this
case the plaintiff fares no better in those additional alterna-
tive theories."1 1 2
Only one case, Challoner v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc.,' 33
has rejected the applicability of the independant contract de-
to construct or install any given work or instrumentality, and has done
the same and it has been accepted by the employer and the contractor
discharged, he is no longer liable to third persons for injuries received
as the result of defective construction or installation.
370 N.E.2d at 619.
Is 384 N.E.2d at 371-72.
119 Id. at 372.
13 481 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1973).
31 Id. at 375.
While we do not suggest that the foregoing principle should be applied
to immunize a manufacturer from liability in every case, we are of the
opinion that Kranco acted reasonably in relying upon Reynolds' indus-
trial expertise and following its plans and specifications, especially
since it is conceded that neither the National Safety Code nor the Oc-
cupational Health and Safety Act require warning devices on pendant
operated cranes such as the one here in question.
Id.
132 Id. at 375 n.2.
1" 512 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1975).
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fense in the strict liability context. Some idea of the hurdles
to be overcome by the manufacturer-defendant in order to re-
ceive the benefits of that defense in the strict liability context,
however, can be ascertained. In Challoner, the manufacturer
argued that the jury was not entitled to find it liable for a
defect in product design since the design was exclusively
within the control of the government. 184 The court responded
that:
[t]he difficulty with this argument is that the cited cases which
absolve defendants who follow defective designs of another
were not decided under a strict liability theory. They involved
attempts to demonstrate negligence and stand only for the pro-
position that there is no negligence in following the design of
another unless the design is such that the defectiveness was
sufficiently obvious to alert a reasonably competent technician
to the danger.
In this case, it was not necessary to prove negligence. The the-
ory alleged is strict liability. A strict liability case, unlike a neg-
ligence case, does not require that the defendant's acts or omis-
sion be the cause of the defect. It is only necessary that the
product be defective when it leaves the defendant's control. 38
Some courts no doubt will find this argument persuasive and
refuse to apply the defense in the strict liability context. Nev-
ertheless, its applicability in the negligence context is firmly
rooted. Moreover, no concrete ground can be found for its lack
of applicability to strict liability given the fact that the cases
are different in nature.
IV. CONCLUSION
The basic policy justifications underlying the strict liability
doctrine do not mandate the extension of the doctrine to
manufacturers of military aircraft or their components. Al-
though courts have held the doctrine of strict tort liability to
be applicable to manufacturers of military ordnance, the deci-
I ld. at 82.
' Id. at 83.
STRICT LIABILITY
sions have not squarely faced the question of whether strict
tort liability should be imposed as a matter of public policy.
Given the differences which exist between "typical" products
liability actions and actions involving products manufactured
for military use, no solid basis can be seen for imposing the
doctrine on manufacturers of military aircraft, especially in a
design context. While it is true that few, if any, courts would
be willing to hold that the doctrine of strict tort liability is
never applicable to a manufacturer of military hardware, it
seems likely that the courts may become persuaded to allow
greater leeway to such manufacturers with regard to defend-
ing the actions against them. Several alternatives available to
the manufacturer have been mentioned. These include con-
tractual indemnity, and equitable credit, and the reliance on
government specifications and requirements. Each of these al-
ternatives represents a viable defense for the manufacturer of
military aircraft.
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